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Director of Training

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Senior Training Program

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1. This paper presents the question: Is there a need for the ~~re-training of senior personnel incident to a proposed~~ CIA career officer training program that will be presented in three phases-- Junior Officer Training, ^{CIA 82-1047, 18/14/82} advanced executive and staff training, and Senior training? Any discussion of a training program must take place within the context of the probable future role of the organization and personnel that are to receive the training. Will CIA remain static, shrink, or continue to grow in the future? OTR believes that, in the long run, the latter is the case and submits the following reasons why CIA will continue to grow:

a. First, it will grow because as more and more nations become increasingly nationalistic in the world, the demands for intelligence and covert action operations pertaining to those nations will continue to increase. Simultaneously, the more the United States follows overt internationalistic policies, the more demands there will be for intelligence and for those peculiar and privy activities of our Government that are the primary responsibility of CIA.

b. Secondly, it will grow because of the growth of the national intelligence concept itself, the increasing recognition that the key factor in most valid national policy decisions pertaining to foreign affairs is factual intelligence; i.e., it can be speculated that the recent "missile controversy" that took up so much of our Director's time would not have occurred if cold facts had been available on what the Russians have and what they are producing.

c. Thirdly, our own progress has and will continue to create more need for our services. We are caught in the cycle of already producing intelligence that creates ever increasing demands for more intelligence.

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2. So things seemingly could not be better for the future of national intelligence and CIA. However, it is when things are at their best that the conscientious analyst has perhaps his greatest obligation to examine them and see if the structure is really as solid as it appears to be. We quote from the 3 April 1960 Washington Post editorial, "New Stars to Steer By":

"In the year 1960 there is need to ponder and articulate the inner meanings and strivings of American society.... There is a gnawing if inchoate yearning for a definition of national purposes that will appeal to man's altruism and intellect beyond his self interest. There is need for leaders who will concern themselves with such purposes and who will seek to galvanize popular concern with them.

"A prosperous society can become smug and selfish and satiated; or it can use the material means and leisure which good fortune and hard work have supplied in such a way as to develop and approach higher aims. We suspect that such aims lie as much in the mind and spirit as in the full dinner pail--that they have to do with the satisfactions which derive from extension of opportunity for the fuller realization of the talents and potential of the individual. We suspect that they deeply concern intellectual values in a cooperative society."

This editorial addressed itself to what the Post believes is a national problem. What applies to the whole of a body politic may simultaneously apply equally well to some or all of its parts, particularly vital organs such as is our Agency.

3. Are there any symptoms of a similar problem within CIA? OTR thinks perhaps there are and would like to propose one solution to these problems if they do in fact exist. For example, there are in CIA professional men and women setting for themselves standards as high as those of law, medicine, or any other profession. Is there a responsibility for our senior leaders to formalize their philosophy of working life and self-discipline for the guidance of the American intelligence officers of the future? What is the equivalent of the Hippocratic oath of the CIA officers? Can any of us name a single profession other than our own that has not taken the time to do this? Our Soviet counterpart certainly has a psychological advantage here though perhaps offset in some instances by overdoses of party indoctrination. Do we appreciate we are perhaps a unique American

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institution in our failure to spell out the psychic, philosophical, and spiritual goals we are striving to attain? Lack of this sort of guidance alone can lead to working at cross purposes and honest differences of opinion prohibiting wholehearted enthusiastic cooperation. Anytime two sincere members of our organization fail to see eye to eye are we quick to explain this with the organization man cliché "personality conflict" without thinking such differences of opinion can stem from someone up the line failing to spell out the spirit behind as well as the letter of our mission? Would the attempt to spell out what the Agency is for and believes in by a group of our senior leaders help the rest of us to support them more fully? It would take time to set out this philosophy without freezing it into dogma that might even deter rather than maintain progress. Is it the obligation of the Agency to set aside a portion of its supergrade careers and provide a location and setting in which they might address themselves to this sort of question? OTR thinks there is and would like to suggest it is time the Agency established a formal "in-service" training program for its senior executives. Let's discuss this further and see what, if anything, a senior training program might do toward maintaining the present progress of the Agency or even accelerating it.

4. What about re-training for our present supergrades? When OTR--as a conscientious though somewhat confused analyst--looks at the broad long-range picture, we too have a nagging concern. That concern is that the successes of CIA over the past 13 years, with certain brilliant exceptions, have been a bit on the superficial side. Have we, for instance, in the excitement of playing with a new toy, allowed ourselves to lag behind in developing fundamental doctrine and assets of the sort which will permit those who follow in our footsteps to develop more rapidly in usefulness to the nation? Our fantastically rapid growth to a position of leadership among the intelligence services of the western world confronts us with great responsibilities. In our eagerness to "make like" a grown-up intelligence service quickly, have we perhaps been forced to run before we really learned how to crawl and got our conceptual foundations a bit distorted in the process? Have we, as a result, sometimes got fact and fancy a bit mixed up so that some of our theoretical structures are based on assumptions of sand (i.e., evaluating a man's judgment on his fitness report when in many instances we mean his prudence) and premises of water (i.e., what we want to believe)? In our efforts to fill in the gaps in the intelligence coverage of other departments of

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our Government and not be scooped by them, have we possibly distorted and even lost sight of the need for a well constructed discipline of our own, designed to free us to do what we should be doing--which is helping to increase the efficiency of the national intelligence process and meeting the highest clandestine collection and covert action needs of our Government, no matter how difficult they may be? Here we use "discipline" in its academic or "scientific method" sense of the well-informed scholar and master of his subject to the point where the disciple knows what is yet to be learned in his field and is capable of making some original contribution to his chosen profession.

5. If there are supergrade employees who share OTR's feeling that fundamental progress has not been as great as it might have been, or at least not as great as we would like it to have been, then there may be the need for refresher training of our senior personnel, if for no other reason than to get them together, free of their daily duties, in seminars and discussion groups to share the benefits of their experience with the rest of the Agency. What of actual importance do we know today about the basics of national intelligence and the control of overseas clandestine operations that we didn't know substantially, if not in full detail, at the time the OSS was liquidated? Do newcomers keep repeating the errors of the past in mounting new programs?

6. Because of necessary compartmentation, OTR certainly doesn't know nearly as much about it as we'd like to. But we just can't seem to find a real case for many important basic intelligence techniques being developed subsequent to 1945. There have been some, but don't we need many more? In any event, let us assume that there has been some lack of progress--or at least an opportunity for greater progress in the Agency--and briefly discuss some of the many problems impeding that progress which training seminars for our senior officers at this time might help solve. First, let us suggest, comes the problem of communication. Coming from all professions and many walks of life as we do, have we established a clear professional vocabulary which is equally meaningful to all of us? Are any of us "solution minded" as opposed to being "problem solving minded"? The former being the temptation to instinctively apply solutions that have worked before to what appears to be a similar problem without complete examination of the facts peculiar to the problem at hand; "problem solving minded" being more concerned with a clear definition of the problem that will convey exactly

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the same meaning to all minds concerned with the problem, the belief being that such definition will then enable people with various backgrounds and skills to arrive at a common solution tailor-made to the problem at hand. We might say the solution minded individual is he who is primarily concerned with operations and the problem solving individual primarily concerned with reporting or getting the intelligence on which to act. Needless to say the good executive may have a preference for either one or both of these opposite approaches but will base his major decisions on a proper melding of the two that will accomplish his objective regardless of the techniques involved. Bringing it right home to the Agency, could this explain a failure to agree, because of human communications difficulties, between two equally sincere and able FI and Covert Action Officers or even a DD/I and DD/P executive. Could senior re-training to effect better human communications help redirect our emphasis and stimulate more willing cooperation within the Agency?

7. Next, let us take the problem of better utilization of Agency manpower. There has been a lot of talk about early retirement, selection out and so on, but what about better usage of what we have? The rewards for better utilization of our personnel are great. Training of advanced and senior level personnel is one of the most effective ways to create an officer corps that will eliminate such practices as:

a. Loss of potentially useful output due to time spent in activities beneath an officer's ability, missions, projects, or programs that never come off, staff studies that take up our time and fill our files but never lead to any action.

b. Assignments of little or no value usually traceable to poor managerial programing and planning and crash solutions simply because of a lack of vision and imagination.

c. Waste of time spent on unassigned activities, personal projects, and the following of different lines of pursuit because someone disagrees with the assigned procedure or may not be aware of a more efficient way of performing the same task that is going on in the next corridor of the Agency.

d. Duplication of efforts and organizational weaknesses stemming from overlapping spheres of responsibility leading to jealousies and animosities and competitive restrictions resulting

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in less Agency-wide cooperation and coordination. On the other hand are we so anxious to get along with fellow bureaucrats that we settle for some goal well below that for which our shop was created rather than driving on through to the attainment of the objective which has been entrusted to us? Coming together on the mutual ground of a training course can help to eliminate this type of weakness which tends to snowball unless aggressively combatted by the majority of our supervisors having an Agency-wide rather than parochial outlook.

e. OTR is in no position to estimate what percentage of Agency time may be wasted due to duplication of effort, but it is apparent to those of us who come in contact with students from all components of the Agency that those students will sometimes discover in our classes that the project that is consuming their time is simultaneously being investigated elsewhere in the Agency and that there is support to their activity of which they were not aware.

8. A third problem area might be a distortion of emphasis which possibly has tended to creep into clandestine operations. Of course all of this is an oversimplification of a complex situation. How many of us have seen projects that are letter perfect from the standpoint of Headquarters operational approval and tradecraft techniques, yet somehow don't emphasize the attainment of the goals of the project and therefore piddle along year after year without ever quite getting around to aggressively attacking the target they are really intended to exploit. Is there a need for more emphasis on the attainment of mission? Do we give priority to the promotion and more responsible assignments of those who successfully attain the objectives of a related mission directive or do other considerations play a more important part in the destinies of our career service? OTR feels that there is a need for a balanced, logical and workable discipline throughout the Agency that will be "objective" oriented rather than "technique" oriented.

a. Is compartmentation and need to know to protect our trade secrets sometimes overdone to the detriment of our overall effort? What do we have in the way of, say, tradecraft secrets that the Soviets don't know at least as well, if not better than, we do. Don't forget the story of the Emperor's new clothes. Everyone was paying lip service to the Emperor's

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new robe until a little child pointed out that the Emperor wasn't wearing any robes at all. Could it be that the great play on secrecy of everything we did was largely hocus pocus because there weren't really any worthwhile trade secrets to reveal, or perhaps not as many as we would have liked to have others believe? Thus as far as the exchange and even publication of doctrinal findings and techniques within the Agency and the American intelligence community is concerned, it seems possible that security need not necessarily be as serious a problem as it is sometimes made out. On the other hand, have we become so bureaucratic in some areas that those things which must be kept secret are difficult to keep privy to those who need to know?

9. All of these completely undocumented remarks lead us to a final problem area that senior seminar groups might like to resolve. Let us put this in the form of a few related questions:

- a. Is trial and error eschewed in some areas of the Agency?
- b. Have we tended to cut off constructive experimentation in clandestine operations by making the standards for the approval and security of such developmental activities too rigorous?
- c. Do we virtually insist that each new proposal be unchallengeable from any direction? Do we sometimes concentrate on measuring less important things within a proposal and reject it because we can measure minutia more accurately? Is there a tendency to reject or ignore proposals if the findings don't fit our own established patterns or originate in our shop?
- d. Do we find ourselves unwilling to build hypotheses on the basis of principles developed from a number of operations, no one of which is conclusive in itself? In fact, have we found time away from the day-to-day preoccupation with individual problems to clearly identify the principles underlying our individual operational successes, and equally important, errors and consolidate these into doctrine to guide the operations of others? For example, what do we know about the psychological manipulation of groups now that we have been in the PP business for over 9 years?

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e. In our covert action efforts are we too often in an "all or nothing" crash operation frame of mind rather than willing to nourish ourselves a bit at a time and thereby build up Agency strength for the future and for our successors?

f. What techniques has the Agency developed for accurately measuring the performance of its components and its officer personnel which can be uniformly applied throughout all of its offices?

10. Until we test such a training program it would be premature to draw any conclusion about this "quick and easy" solution to possibly accelerating the progress of the Agency toward its national goals. However, it would seem possible that from it some of our top managers would learn at least a little more than they knew before about the human communications and motivational problems of the Agency. What is proposed here is simplicity in itself--so simple in fact that everybody seems to have overlooked it in recent years. Is there even a reluctance in some quarters to pull together and look at the record of what CIA training our supergrade executives have had? If the record is not one that can stand examination then it adds weight to the need for such training. Nor are we proposing training for training's sake. Frankly we want a closer and more prolonged association with those executives whose experience is such that training has nothing to offer to them--they are the ones that have the most to offer to OTR that we can pass on to their subordinates.

11. OTR does have one area of self-interest in this proposal. Top management may generate brilliant policies, strategies, and tactics for the Agency, based upon the soundest kind of thinking, but if they are not transmitted down the line by the DTR and his staff in the Agency's training programs, both top management and training are left operating in a vacuum. Frankly there is a gap in the Agency's training efforts. Maximum results can only be achieved by consistent training at all levels. The type senior training we advocate would be hard-working group seminars charged with formulating solutions to specific problems of the Agency and dry-running of those major planning and programming exercises which are the unique responsibility of CIA top management. Time and opportunity would be provided for deliberate philosophical reflection about the real Agency objectives and to develop improved methods

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for attaining those goals.

OTR believes it will get the opportunity to train the GS-14's who may need this type of instruction but feels there probably are some super-grades who need it too.

12. We have raised some interesting and controversial subjects which you might find being discussed in any of the halls of the Agency. Even if they are unvalidated and completely imaginary, training situations involving eliminating them from the minds of subordinates or solving those that may be real would better prepare officers for the highest positions of responsibility in policy determination and executive coordination, planning, and administration of the Agency here and at overseas posts and in interdepartmental and international relationships. Thus we would create a senior block of instruction to provide stimulation to the planning mind and the environmental framework for a free and vigorous spirit of inquiry into the complexities of controlling a national intelligence organization at home and abroad. This we must do as world circumstances are ever and rapidly changing. Consequently organization, administration, strategy, doctrine, and tactics must change also. The senior official needs some time away from his day-to-day chores if he is to make his maximum contribution to assisting CIA to meet the future.

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13. Let us summarize what we have been trying to say:

a. Things could hardly look better for the long-range future of the Agency. Certainly in quality and probably in quantity CIA is going to need better trained and probably more manpower than ever.

b. It may be appropriate, however, to question how much truly basic progress has been made in the "science" of intelligence operations of all types.


c. If progress has been a bit disappointing, perhaps it has been inhibited to a degree at least, by the very stringent requirements which seemingly have to be met before we take any action not conforming to established patterns.

d. Some of our better operators seem to go ignorantly on their way happily ignoring these requirements--though perhaps compensating by paying greater attention to the accomplishment of the missions of the Agency. Hence the question arises as to whether such requirements unnecessarily discourage experimental activities and the reporting of the results thereof.

e. The Agency seems a bit divided between those who would build up a professional intelligence discipline based primarily on attainment of objectives and those who would borrow heavily from other professions and think primarily in terms of techniques.

f. OTR, while obviously confused by it all, finds itself ever more impressed by what can be learned by getting those with divergent job backgrounds and different opinions together in an academic environment and studying those problems which many feel exist but no one in authority ever seems to finally dismiss or resolve.

g. A senior re-training program might accelerate the progress of the Agency in many of its fields of responsibility.

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